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6.1 Introduction
The experimental literature on social dilemmas has long documented the
positive effect of communication on cooperation. Sally (1995), in a meta-
analysis spanning thirty-five years of Prisoner's Dilemma experiments,
shows that the possibility of communicating significantly increases cooper-
ation. Social psychologists have explained such a finding by hypothesizing
that the act of communicating contributes to promoting trust by creating
empathy among participants (see Loomis (1959), Desforges et al. (1991),
Davis and Perkowitz (1979)). Bicchieri (2002, 2006), in a different perspec-
tive, puts forward a focusing function of communication hypothesis,
according to which communication can focus agents on shared rules of
behavior and - when it does focus them on pro-social ones - generates a
normative environment which is conducive to cooperation. More specific-
ally, when individuals face an unfamiliar situation, they need cues to under-
stand how best to act and, for this reason, they check whether some
behavioral rule they are aware of applies to the specific interaction. The
effect of communication is to make a behavioral rule situational/y salient,
that is, communication causes a shift in an individual's focus towards the
strategies dictated by the now-salient rule. In doing so, communication also
coordinates players' mutual expectations about which strategies will be
chosen by the parties. In other words, (under some conditions) communi-
cation elicits social norms.
While a large proportion of studies on the effect of pre-play communi-
cation focuses on Prisoner's Dilemma games, Bicchieri, Lev-On, and Chavez
(2010) examine behavior in sequential trust games. In what follows we shall
look at those findings, discuss an interpretation based on the above hypoth-
esis, and suggest a theoretical application that can account for it. Given that
our analysis equally applies to the Prisoner's Dilemma, this essay contributes
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to the broad literature on social dilemmas by proposing an application for
dynamic interactions. I
Bicchieri (2002) provides the basis for the focusing function of communi-
cation argument: when a rule of behavior becomes situationally salient, it
causes a shift in an individual's focus, thereby generating empirical and
normative expectations that direct one's actions. Before we elaborate on the
argument, it is convenient to summarize Bicchieri's conditions for a social
norm to exist and be followed.2 A social norm exists and is followed by a
population if two conditions are satisfied. First, every individual must be
aware that she is in a situation in which a particular rule of behavior applies
("contingency" clause). Second, every individual prefers to conform to it, on
the double condition ("conditional preference" clause) that: (I) she believes
that most people conform to it (i.e. empirical expectations condition), and (2)
she believes that most people believe she ought to conform to it (i.e,normative
expectations condition).
In order to develop an equilibrium model that can capture more precisely
the variables the experimenter manipulates in a laboratory environment,
Bicchieri's model can be integrated with psychological game theory
(Geanakoplos et al. 1989, Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009). Such integration
allows one to explicitly formalize the impact of the above conditions on a
I It should be noted that a dichotomous Trust Game can be thought of as a special version of the
sequential Prisoner's Dilemma where payoffs are given as follows:
c o
2 2
c o c D
(~)
with r1 > tj =PI > SI and t2 > '2 > P2 = 52' (Instead, in a Prisoner's Dilemma payoffs satisfy the
following inequality: t; > r, > Pi > 5" Vi E [I, 2}.)
2 Bicchieri (2006: 11).
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player's utility by incorporating conjectures about norms into the expected
utility of a conformist player (Sontuoso 2013).
This chapter draws on the above theoretical trealments and provides an
application illustrating how a formal framework that allows for different
conjectures about norms is able to capture the focusing function of communi-
cation and to explain experimental results. In sum, the core of the argument is
that communication can focus people on some behavioral rule that is relevant
to the specific interaction. In so doing, it coordinates players' mutual expect-
ations about which strategies will be played. So - if the aforementioned
contingency condition holds - one may assume that making a behavioral
rule salient through communication will result in greater compliance with the
rule (Cialdini et aI. 199I).
The remainder of the chapter is organized in this manner: Section 6.2
discusses Bicchieri, Lev-On, and Chavez's (2010) experimental results on the
effect of communication in trust games; Section 6.3 briefly reviews models of
norm compliance; Section 6.4 provides an application accounting for the
focusing function of communication; and Section 6.5 draws conclusions.
6.2 Experimental evidence
Bicchieri, Lev-On, and Chavez (2010) study two features of pre-play commu-
nication in trust games: content relevance of the message (i.e, relevant vs.
irrelevant communication) and media richness (i.e. face-to-face, "FlF," vs,
computer-mediated communication, "CMC").
Consider the following trust game: the investor (first-mover) receives $6
and can choose to send any discrete amount x to the trustee (second-mover);
the amount the trustee receives is tripled by the experimenter, so that the
trustee can then send any discrete amount y in the interval [0, 3x] back to the
investor. See Figure 6.1.
In the experiment participants were paired randomly and played three
variants of the above game, each time with a different subject, in the following
order: (1) no-communication game (i.e. the baseline condition just described);
(2) irrelevant or relevant CMC communication game; (3) irrelevant or relevant
FtF communication game.' Investors did not receive feedback on the amount
J In the CMC conditions subjects could communicate via computer-based text chat for five
minutes, whereas in the PtP conditions subjects communicated face-to-face for two minutes.
In the irrelevant conditions subjects were instructed that they could discuss only the questions
given by the experimenter (about a completely irrelevant topic), whereas in the relevant
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Figure 6.1 The trust game of Bicchieri, Lev-On. and Chavez (2010)
that the trustee returned until the end of the experimental session; also, after
making their decision - in each variant of the game - investors were asked to
report their expectation about the amount returned by the trustee. The authors
were interested in three dependent variables: trust (defined as the amount of
dollars sent by the investor), reciprocity (the amount returned by the trustee),
and expectation (the amount the investor expected to get back).
Table 6.1 shows the participants' average responses across the five combin-
ations of relevance and medium: a first look at the table reveals that both relevance
and medium had large, positive effects on the three dependent variables. Note that
relevant face-to-face communication had the largest effects on all three variables
while relevant computer-mediated communication had the second largest effects.
Figure 6.2 on p.106 illustrates the distribution of trust across the five conditions.
conditions they could discuss any topic except their identities. (Roughly half of the experi-
mental sessions featured the relevant conditions while the remaining sessions featured the
irrelevant conditions.)
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Table 6.1 Mean (SEM) of trust, reciprocity, and investor's expectations
by communication relevance and medium (N ~ 96). FtF ~ Face-to-face;
CMC ""-Computer-mediated communication.
FtF- CMC- FtF- CMC-
Control Relevant Relevant Irrelevant Irrelevant
(N=32) (N=14) (N=14) (N=18) (N=18)
Trust 2.63 5.57 (0.46) 5.14 (0.57) 4.17 (0.49) 3.28 (0.61)
(0.36)
Reciprocity 1.92 7.57 (0.96) 5.14 (1.33) 3.33 (1.05) 1.94 (0.78)
(0.48)
Expected 3.54 8.36 (0.69) 7.43 (0.96) 5.56 (0.91) 4.28 (0.93)
reciprocity (0.53)
As shown in Figure 6.2, investors were most trusting in both relevant commu-
nication conditions (where the majority sent their entire $6 endowment).
The authors' further data analysis discloses the following key points: (I) the
behavior of investors was strongly determined by their expectations of trustees'
reciprocation;' (2) the variable most conducive to creating such expectations was
not the medium, but rather the content relevance of the message (i.e. investments
were Significantly higher following unrestricted communication than restricted
or no communication and - whenever communication was restricted to irrele-
vant topics - there were no Significant differences between the amounts sent in
the CMC, FtF, and control conditions); (3) reciprocity significantly increased
with trust, content relevance of the message, and medium (more precisely,
reciprocity was higher in the CMC condition for lower amounts of trust but
became higher in the FtF condition for higher amounts of trust).'
How do such results relate to the two explanations for the effect of
communication on social dilemmas that we mentioned in the introduction
(i.e. one explanation maintains that communication enhances cohesion and
4 Note, however, that those expectations were rarely met, since expected reciprocation was
significantly higher than the actual reciprocation across conditions (except when $6 was
invested).
5 For instance, as the amount that the investor sent approached zero. the odds that the trustee
returned each available dollar were over seven times higher in CMC than in PtE With each
additional dollar that the investor sent, however. the odds that the trustee reciprocated
increased more rapidly in FtF conditions. In other words, the probability of returning each
available dollar increased with the amount invested, but increased more rapidly for the FtF and
control conditions than for CMC.
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Figure 6.2 Distribution of trust by communication medium and relevance
group identity while the other asserts that communication elicits social
norms)? The data seem to provide evidence in favor of the latter explanation:
in fact, if the former were valid, then one should not find an effect of content
relevance on the expected reciprocation (point (2) above). On the other hand,
Bicchieri's focus theory of norms is consistent with the data, since it predicts
an effect of the message content relevance on the expected reciprocation.
Specifically, Bicchieri (2002, 2006) hypothesizes that, when participants are
allowed to talk about the strategic situation at hand, the discussion on "how to
appropriately behave" will lead the participants to become aware of the fact
that the current interaction is one to which some default rule of behavior
applies." Hence, focusing subjects on a rule of behavior generates and coord-
inates empirical and normative expectations.
6.3 Theoretical foundations
In what follows we review two formal, theoretical treatments of norms and
subsequently draw on them to develop an application accounting for the
experimental results.
Bicchieri (2006: 52) proposes a general utility function based on norms.
Considering an n-player normal form game, let S; denote the strategy set of
Player i and S_, = Il",Sj be the set of strategy profiles of players other than i.
A norm N, is defined as a (set-valued) function from one's expectation
about the opponents' strategies to the "strategies one ought to take," that is,
N,: L_, -> S;, with L_, <; L/ A strategy profile s = (SI>"" sn) is said to
instantiate a norm for Player j if Lj E Lj (i.e. if ~ is defined at '-j), and
6 See Lev-On et al. (2010) for the effect of group (vs. dyadic) communication in trust games_
7 For example, in an a-player Prisoner's Dilemma a shared norm may be to cooperate: in that
case, L_i includes the cooperate strategies of all players other than i. Note that in the case
where - given the others' strategies - there is not a norm prescribing how Player i should
behave, then Ni is not defined at L_I•
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to violate a norm if, for some j, it instantiates a norm for j but Sj oj NiL).
Player i's utility function is a linear combination of i's material payoff 1Ci(S)
and a component that depends on norm compliance:
where k, 2: 0 represents i's sensitivity to the norm and j refers to the norm
violator. The norm-based component represents the maximum loss
(suffered by players other than the norm violator j) resulting from all norm
violations: the first maximum operator takes care of the possibility that there
might be multiple rule-complying strategy profiles; the second maximum
operator ranges over all the players other than the norm violator j.
Bicchieri's utility function makes it possible for the experimenter to test
whether subjects' behavior is consistent with preferences for conformity to a
social norm, given that the above-mentioned conditions for the existence of
a social norm are satisfied (i.e. contingency, and preferences conditional on
the relevant empirical and normative expectations; see Bicchieri 2006).
Specifically, this utility function captures conformist preferences in case a
norm exists. Hence, the norm-based component of the utility function
represents the maximum loss resulting from all violations of an
established norm.
Bicchieri's utility function makes very sharp predictions in cases where
there is no ambiguity about subjects' expectations as to what the norm
prescribes. In order to explicitly represent conditionally conformist prefer-
ences in dynamic games where multiple rules of behavior may apply,
Sontuoso (2013) extended Bicchieri's framework to a "psychological" utility
function and a belief-based formulation of her conditions for norm exist-
ence (which are directly reflected into the player's utility function). Given
that in Bicchieri's theory of norms expectations are crucial to compliance,
having a model of how subjects derive their conjectures about norms may be
useful for interpreting the experimental results of Bicchieri, Lev-On, and
Chavez (2010).
Before outlining such a model of norm compliance, we shall introduce
some notation on dynamic games: let an extensive form game be given by
(N, H, P, (OiEN), where N is the set of players, H is the set of feasible
histories, l, is the information partition of Player i. Further, let Z denote the
set of terminal histories, with H \ Z being the set of non-terminal histories;
given that, let P denote the player function (which assigns to each element of
H \ Z an element of N), and let Ai(h) denote the set of feasible actions for
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Player iat history h.8 The material payoffs of players' strategies are described
by functions m;: Z -> lR for each player iE N. Then, denote the set of Player
i's pure strategies allowing history h as S;(h); strategy profiles allowing
history h are defined as S(h), and S_;(h) for all players j other than i;
given that, let z(s) indicate a terminal history induced by some strategy
profile s E S. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) provide a framework for the
analysis of dynamic psychological games where conditional higher-order
systems of beliefs influence players' preferences: as in their model, here it
is assumed that (at each history) every player holds an updated system
of first-order beliefs U; = (u;(-Ih»hEH; about the strategies of all the
co-players." at each history Player i further holds a system of second-order
beliefs fJ; about the first-order belief system of each of the opponents.!"
The model of norm compliance we employ (Sontuoso 2013) assumes there
exists a set of default rules of behavior, where each rule specifies strategies
appropriate to generic (mixed-motive) games; players have a subset of
such rules stored in their minds and derive from them "norm-conjectures"
(I,e, expectations as to which rule-driven strategies apply to the current game).
Therefore, if an individual j is a norm-driven player - and presumes that her
co-players are norm-driven too - she can form her first-order belief Uj by
assuming her co-players' behavior to be consistent with some rule.
A "behavioral rule" is defined as a set-valued function r that assigns to every
non-terminal history h one or more elements from the set of strategy profiles
S(h)ll The set of behavioral rules is denoted by R, and the behavioral rule
subset of Player iby R; (with R; c;: R), with R; representing the set of rules i is
aware of. Further, given a game G and some rule r, one can derive the
8 Note that a node of the game tree is identified with the history leading up to it (i.e. a path in
the game tree) as in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
9 For example, in a game with perfect information, at each h E Hi Player j holds an updated
belief a;(·lh) such that she believes that all players have chosen all the actions leading to h with
probability 1.
10 It is assumed that players' beliefs at different information sets must satisfy Bayes' rule and
common knowledge of Bayesian updating.
11 For instance, consider a rule that prescribes behavior minimizing payoff-inequality among
players: when one evaluates this rule at the initial history, the rule will dictate those strategy
profiles that minimize the difference in payoffs among players, considering that every
terminal node can be reached; instead if one of the players deviates along the play, when
evaluating this behavioral rule at a history following such a deviation, the rule will dictate
strategy profiles that minimize the difference in payoffs among players, conditional on the
terminal nodes that can still be reached (Sontuoso 2013).
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set of strategy profiles dictated by r (e.g. the set of strategy profiles dictated
by r, when evaluated at the initial history, is denoted by r(ho)); given R, <;; R,
one can derive the set of Player ;'S "rule-complying" actions at history h
(denoted by A'.h(R,(ho»), which depicts the set of actions prescribed - by
any of the rules r E R, - to Player i at history h.
Finally, a "norm-conjecture" of Player i is defined as a collection of
independent probability measures p, = (p,(·lh»hEH\Z (with p,(alh) being
the probability of action a at history h) such that the support of p, is a
subset of the rule-complying actions of the active player at history h.
Conditionally conformist preferences are represented by an expected
utility function given by a linear combination of the player's material
payoff and a component representing some disutility arising from devi-
ations from the presumed norm.'? Formally, a norm-driven individual
has conditionally conformist preferences characterized by a utility function
uf of the form
with '-, E 5_,(z), k, E [0, (0) and where: k, is Player i's sensitivity to
the presumed norm; df is a dummy variable equal to one if i is aware
of one or more behavioral rules applicable to the given game, equal
to zero otherwise; df is a dummy variable equal to one if i believes that
every j # i is aware and will also adhere to some r E R, equal to zero
otherwise.i"
In the next section we shall provide an application illustrating how a formal
framework that can allow for different (conjectures about) norms is able to
capture the focusing function of communication and to explain the experi-
mental results of Bicchieri, Lev-On, and Chavez (2010).
12 More precisely, the anticipated disutility is a function of any positive difference between the
"initially expected payoff to j" and the payoff j would get in the event of a rule violation.
Note that it is assumed that if Player j is a norm-driven individual - and presumes that her
co-players are norm-driven too - she can form her first-order belief aj by assuming her
co-players' behavior to be consistent with some norm-conjecture Pj = Pi (hence, with some
rule r}.
13 E[X] denotes the expected value of X.
14 After deriving a belief-based formulation of Bicchieri's conditions for a social norm to exist
and be followed, Sontuoso (2013) proposed a notion of "Social Sequential Equilibrium"
allowing for belief-dependent conformist motivations (by refining Battigalli and Dufwen-
berg's specification of the sequential equilibrium concept of Kreps and Wilson 1982).
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6.4 An application accounting for the focusing function
of communication
First, we shall define some specific behavioral rules reflecting principles
~ which are usually assumed to regulate behavior in social dilemmas and which,
one may assume, could apply to the trust game of Bicchieri, Lev-On,
and Chavez (see Figure 6.1 above). It is useful to recall here the above
definition of behavioral rule, i.e. a correspondence dictating the strategy
profiles most "appropriate" - according to a certain principle - for each
node of the given mixed-motive game. Also, given a set of potential rules R,
we assume that each player's culture identifies a subset R, (stored in i's
memory) which contains default rules of behavior that the player is aware
of (Sontuoso 2013).
Recall that the trust game of Bicchieri, Lev-On, and Chavez (2010) was
defined as follows: the investor receives $6 and can choose to send any
discrete amount x to the trustee; the amount the trustee receives is tripled
by the experimenter, so that the trustee can then send any discrete amount y
in the interval [0, 3x] back to the investor. Given that, here are some rules
applicable to the experimental trust game.
• "Inequality-Reducing" rule, I: any strategy profile such that the investor
chooses an amount x (other than $0), and the trustee chooses an amount y
that minimizes the difference in payoffs.
• "Pareto-Efficiency" rule,!': any strategy profile such that the investor
chooses $6, and the trustee chooses any amount.
• "Reciprocity" rule, re: any strategy profile such that the investor chooses an
amount x (other than $0), and the trustee chooses an amount y 2: x.
Before applying the above rules, note that in what follows we denote an
action by the amount sent; for example, if the investor (1) chooses action
$6, then the set of the trustee's (1) feasible actions at history h = $6 is
given by ATC$6) = {$IS, $17, $16, ... , $2, $1, SO}. It follows that if the
investor chooses, say, $1 and then the trustee chooses also $1, the payoff
profile induced by the path ($1, $1·) is given by the pair ($6, $2).
Now, considering for example I, one can derive the set of strategy profiles
dictated by !'which - when evaluated at the initial history - contains five
elements, that is: (1) the strategy profile where the investor chooses $6 and the
trustee chooses $9if$6 $7'[$5 $5if$4 $3'[$3 $lif$2 $Oif$l>which yields the payoff
profile ($9, $9); (2) the strategy profile where the investor chooses $5 and the
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trustee chooses the same as above, which yields the payoff profile ($8, $8),
etc.... In short, using the above notation, the set of paths dictated by;' is
given by:
rF (ho) = {($6, $9), ($5, $7,), ($4, $5,), ($3,$3·), ($2, $1·n.
Similarly, considering r', one can derive the set of paths dictated by r'
which - when evaluated at the initial history - contains nineteen elements,
that is:
{($6, $18·), ($6, $17), ... , ($6, $1), ($6, $0·n.
Also, the set of paths dictated by rC is given by:
{
($6,$18·),($6,$17')' .. ,($6,$6),($5,$15·),($5,$14')' ,($5,$5), }
($4,$12·),($4,$11')' ,($4,$4·),($3,$9·),($3,$8·), ,($3,$3,), .
($2, $6·), ($2, $5·), , ($2, $2·), ($1, $3·), ($1, $2·), ($1, $1·)
Next, if one assumes that both the investor (1) and the trustee (7) are
aware of all the above behavioral rules (i.e. R[ ~ RT ~ {r", r", rCl) then
one can derive, for each player, the set of rule-complying actions at
history h, which depicts the set of actions prescribed - by any of the rules
r E R; - to Player i at history h. For the investor this is given by
Ai~[. h~h"(R;(hO)) = {$6,$5, ... ,$1} while for the trustee there will be one
set of rule-complying actions for each history, i.e.
A;~T. h~$6(Ri(ho)) = {$18, $17, ... , $6}, A;~T, h~$5(R;(ho)) =
{$15,$14, ... ,$5}, ... ,Ai~T, h~$i(R;(ho)) = {$3,$2,$1}.
It is now clear that the aforementioned rules, when applied to the experimental
trust game, dictate several strategy profiles. Jt then follows that the support of
i's norm-conjecture Pi (i.e. the set of the active player's rule-complying actions
that are assigned positive probability by Pi) may contain any of the above rule-
complying actions. Especially in cases like this, where there are several admis-
sible (i.e, rule-complying) actions - unless players can communicate - it might
be difficult for them to engage in a process of mutually consistent belief forma-
tion relative to a presumed social norm: this may result in no social norm
being followed.Instead, assume that a rule prescribing behavior that minimizes
payoff-inequality among players is made salient through communication;
in this case R[ and RT are still defined as above (i.e. R[ ~ RT = {r", r', rCn,
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but now it is reasonable to assume that players will converge towards a
norm-conjecture derived from l' only (and, in turn, they will derive their
first- and second-order beliefs from such a norm-conjecture). In light of the
experimental results discussed in Section 6.2, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that - in the experiment of Bicchieri, Lev-On, and Chavez (2010) and,
specifically, in the relevant face-tal ace communication condition - the
Inequality-Reducing rule!' constituted a social norm and was being followed
by the experimental subjects." In fact, as shown in Figure 6.2, the relevant
FtF communication game exhibited such a high level of trust that almost
every investor contributed her entire $6 endowment (while the average
amount returned by the trustee was almost $8, and the modal choice was $9).
More explicitly,note that the norm-conjecture induced by 1', for Vi E N, is
such that: Pi may take on value I for anyone of the investor's actions (other
than $0), and takes on value 0 for all of the trustee's actions but $9if'6' $7 if'S'
$Sif'4' $3if$3, $li['2' $Oif$l' Given that, each player i can form her first-order
belief a,by assuming her co-player's behavior to be consistent with her norm-
conjecture Pi: for example, the investor's belief a, = (·Iho) will correspond to a
probability measure over the strategies of the trustee, with the support of a,
containing only the opponent's rule-complying strategies. Using formula (2)
above, the investor can then calculate the expected utility from each of her
actions as follows: first, note that the investor's utility would involve a
potentiatloss (i.e. a "psychological" disutility) only at x = $0 while it would
be maximized at x = $6 (conditional on the trustee's sensitivity k,.). Yet before
considering the latter case, let's look at the game from the trustee's perspec-
tive: in order to calculate the optimal action at each history after which she
has to move, the trustee will compare her utility of conforming with her utility
of deviating from the presumed norm; so, the trustee's expected utility from
deviating (choosing, say, $0) after the investor has chosen x = $6 would equal
U~(Z,Pi,PT) = 18 - kTII + 9];'6 instead, the trustee's utility from choosing
15 A social norm r* (exists and) is followed by population N if: every player i E N has conformist
preferences represented by a utility function uf (as given in formula (2) above), with df = 1,
dT = 1, and ki > OJ every player i maximizes her expectation of U(; every i holds correct
beliefs about every f's V E N, with j 1= i) first-order belief and behavior; every player i's
behavior is consistent with one of the end-nodes yielded by r* E R;nRj (according to norm-
conjectures Pi == P; for Vj E N); kj is sufficiently large for every i E N (Sontuoso 2013). (See also
Blcchieri (2006: 11) for the conceptual distinction between the existence of a norm versus its
being followed.)
16Note that, for some player i, Uf{Z,Lj,fiJ represents i's estimation of Uf{z>L;,aj).
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$9 after x = $6 would simply correspond to her material payoff (i.e. m,..{z($6,
$9)) = $9). In brief, the trustee's conformist preferences can be expressed
compactly as: 18 - 10kT <:: 9 =? kT 2 fa. If the investor effectively believes
that k.; 2 fa, then she will compare her utility from taking a rule-complying
strategy against her utility from deviating from the presumed norm: the
investor's expected utility from deviating (i.e. choosing x = $0) would equal
uf(z,p"P,) = 6 - kI[1 +y], where the "initially expected payoff to the
trustee" given the strategy ST = y. (i.e. Ep"",a,.[mrlhO]) is now denoted by
y for convenience. Instead, the investor's expected utility from choosing x =
$6 would be given by mICz($6, $9)) = $9. Hence, the investor's conformist
preferences can be expressed compactly as: 6 - kIll + y] <:: 9 =? kI 2 - I~Y'
which is always satisfied. To conclude, the investor will choose $6 and the
trustee will choose $9if $6 $7if $5 $Sif $4 $3if $3 $Iif $2 $Oif$1 (whenever
kT 2 fa)·
To sum up, if a rule prescribing behavior that minimizes payoff-inequality
among players is made salient through communication, the equilibrium path
will involve the investor choosing $6 and the trustee choosing $9, so that both
players' payoff is $9: again, looking at Table 6.1 above, one may conclude
that - in the relevant face-to-face communication condition - subjects did
play an equilibrium where norm-conjectures were correct. In other words,
communication coordinated players' expectations by making a particular rule
salient. Besides, note that moving from relevant face-to-face communication
to relevant computer-mediated communication somewhat reduced both reci-
procity and expected reciprocity. Indeed, when relevant communication is
allowed, the expectation that trustees will abide by the social norm activated
through communication is likely to be less vivid in a computer-mediated than
in a face-to-face environment (and coordinating expectations will be more
dtfficutt)."
6.5 Conclusion
We investigated the focusing (and coordinating) function of communication:
drawing on experimental evidence we have argued that - when a behavioral
rule becomes situationally salient - it causes a shift in an individual's focus,
thereby generating (empirical and normative) expectations that direct one's
strategies. We presented an application illustrating how a formal framework
17 In this respect see also the discussion in Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007).
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that allows for different conjectures about norms is able to capture such a
focusing function.
Given that this framework allows us to compare predictions under different
focal rules of behavior, it could be of help in designing novel experiments that
study the dynamics of the cognitive processes characterizing sequential trust
games and, more generally, social dilemmas that involve a stage of
non-binding, pre-play communication among participants.
